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Abstract 
With reference to a case study which illustrates the existence of segmented markets 
and international price discrimination, this paper develops a theoretical model of 
comparative advantage in which domestic prices may be sticky. We show, when 
domestic prices do not converge to world prices, the effects of international trade 
upon domestic welfare are ambiguous. In particular, for a nation with no absolute 
advantage, specialising in comparatively advantageous production will reduce welfare 
where prices are sticky. This finding contrasts with the general view that pursuit of 
comparative advantage will always increase welfare. 
 
JEL Codes A1 General Economics; C6 Mathematical Methods and Programming; F1 
Trade 
 
 
1. Introduction: cons and pros 
 
Comparative advantage is a cornerstone of globalisation theory. It theorises that, where two 
countries trade, they will both be better off if they specialise in producing the products that 
they make comparatively better (Ricardo, 1817; Dornbusch et al., 1977; Shiozawa, 2007). 
The merits of globalisation are seen by some economists as incontestable (Harford, 2007) 
and have been confirmed in terms of aggregate economic growth (Dreher, 2006). As 
summarised by Samuelson and Nordhaus (2010: 442), “the theory of comparative advantage 
is one of the deepest truths in all of economics”. Bernhofen and Brown (2005: 208) similarly 
claim “The one point on which most economists will agree is that opening up to international 
trade will increase a country’s economic welfare”. See Arkolakis et al. (2012) for a recent 
review of theory and some limited empirical results. 
 
Notwithstanding, it is clear that trade between economies may be more complicated than 
trade within an economy. For example, some argue that the benefits of globalisation are 
illusory or at least limited to those who wield economic power (Canterbery, 2001; Dong-Hyeon 
et al., 2012; McClintock, 1996; Samuelson, 2004). This raises the issue of asymmetric free 
trade where the benefits of trade are particularly clouded in developing economies: “instead of 
workers moving from low productivity jobs to high productivity jobs, [supposedly] the ‘promise’ 
of liberalization, workers move from low productivity jobs to unemployment” (Stiglitz 2002: 4). 
Even in developed economies, the effects of trade liberalisation may not be entirely benign; 
for example, Melitz and Trefler (2012) claim jobs in the USA have been lost as a result of 
import substitution.  
 
Globalisation may also lead to environmental damage; in this connexion, Brander and Taylor 
(1997: 549) claim “international trade may provide lower steady-state utility than autarky, and 
the overall welfare consequences of free trade may well be negative”. Fujiwara (2012) also 
warns that increasing international trade can lead to welfare losses because of pollution.  
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Our contention is that, even where free trade occurs symmetrically, the benefits from free 
trade are ambiguous as one of the implicit assumptions of the model is often not realised: the 
assumption that domestic prices adjust to world prices. In practice, domestic prices may not 
be free to adjust quickly to converge with world prices. As Ricci (2006: 52) outlines, “trade 
theory usually ignores the existence of short-run market rigidities”.  
 
Previous analyses of international trade have used different assumptions.  Some writers refer 
to monopolistic competition (Melitz and Trefler, 2012; Neary, 2009: 225); others assume 
oligopoly (Neary, 2009: 241).  Arkolakis et al. (2012) consider perfect competition and 
monopolistic competition. In the following, we determine mathematically the consequences on 
welfare if this assumption is not realised. Our model is a conventional, two-economy, two-
good model, except that we do not assume that domestic prices adjust to world prices. 
Rather, we assume that prices are either “sticky”, or that market segmentation and price 
discrimination occurs. This assumption may significantly change the conclusion of 
conventional globalisation theory:  to wit, rather than trade improving welfare, our model 
suggests that globalisation could harm a domestic economy.  
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section two we discuss the evidence of sticky 
domestic prices in an international context. Our mathematical model is specified in section 
three, where we also discuss the implications of the analysis; section four concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Sticky prices: consumers, contradictions and costs  
 
2.1 Motivating case study 
 
In 2002, Levi Strauss, a multinational clothing manufacturer and retailer, closed its last two 
factories in Scotland, claiming that “production costs in Scotland were up to 60% higher than 
elsewhere in Europe” (BBC News 22 March 2002).1 The company had “done its sums” (ibid.) 
and concluded that the UK plants were uneconomic. However, any savings that the domestic 
(UK) consumer might have expected to make from the anticipated cost reductions were not 
realised. The local price of this clothing did not decline. Indeed, later that same year, Tesco, a 
major UK supermarket, lost a legal battle to parallel-import Levi jeans sourced from Mexico, 
Canada and the United States. By importing the jeans and reselling to the domestic market, 
Tesco would have been able to reduce the retail price to the UK consumer by nearly 50% 
(Telegraph 1 August 2002). However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that retailers 
required trademark holders’ permission to import goods in this way. 
 
Since the Tesco court case, Levi Strauss has continued to take legal action to maintain 
segmented markets for its products. In 2011 it secured an injunction against the online retailer 
Papikian’s use of its trademark and applied to prohibit Papikian from importing Levi jeans into 
Europe (Krongold Law, 2011). The USA judge ruled that the latter issue was a matter for the 
ECJ, but as Calboli (2012) has pointed out, the ECJ has adopted an increasingly narrow 
interpretation of “consent” over the last ten years, further strengthening the protection for 
trade-mark holders. Thus, globalised manufacturers are able to take advantage of 
international labour markets to reduce costs, while retailers are constrained from taking 
                                                     
1 This was part of Levi Straus’ policy of shifting away from internal production towards outsourcing: the 
last of its American factories were closed in 2003, its Canadian factories in 2004. 
real-world economics review, issue no. 73 
subscribe for free     WEA eBooks 
 
94 
 
advantage of international goods markets to reduce prices. In other words, UK (and 
European) consumers are forced to pay a premium above the world price. This case study 
highlights that, while the costs of globalisation to UK workers are evident in terms of reduced 
job security, the benefits of globalisation are, at the very least, questionable. 
 
2.2 Generally sticky prices 
 
The lack of instant adjustment of “sticky prices” in response to a change in supply or demand 
has frequently been observed in economics (Álvarez et al., 2006; Faia and Monacelli, 2008; 
Ricci, 2006).  An explicit expression of this conundrum is made by Lipsey and Swedenborg 
(2007: 20), who claim “international differences in national price levels and prices of individual 
products are striking and have persisted over long periods, despite the presumed equalizing 
influence of international trade and despite the liberalization of trade and reduction of 
transport costs that have occurred.” Such differences in international prices exist even within 
the European Union, despite the supposed Single Market: “between 65% of firms (Spain) and 
92% (Germany) use price discrimination … About half of firms charge different prices 
depending on the country [in which] the good is sold” (Dhyne et al., 2009: 67). 
 
Despite general consensus within economic theory, the assumption that domestic prices will 
converge to world prices can be granted only limited empirical support. In the UK, there is 
much anecdotal evidence of prices failing to adjust fully to world prices (see, for example, 
Telegraph 22 June 2009, Guardian 13 April 2012, Daily Mail 31 May 2012). 
 
There are many reasons why the price of a good may differ between two countries, such as: 
 
• tax-rates may be higher in one country than another (Jones, 1987; Melitz and Trefler, 
2012: 103). 
• imports tend to lower prices (Melitz and Trefler, 2012: 97); therefore import barriers – 
artificially constraining supply – may prevent domestic prices falling to world prices. 
• a government may subsidise exports (Neary, 2009; Trela et al. 1987). 
• exchange-rates between currencies may be held at an artificial level by government 
so as to promote a current account surplus. 
• random changes in exchange-rates may have long-term effects on prices where 
adjustment is slow (Frankel, 1984). 
 
The above reasons apply in any market structure, including perfect competition. If a firm has 
monopoly power (monopoly or monopolistic competition or oligopoly), there are more reasons 
why prices may differ between countries: 
 
• a firm may carry out “dumping”, i.e. selling below cost price in a foreign country to 
gain future profits (Neary, 2009). 
• a firm with market power could set different prices in different countries, depending on 
demand elasticity. 
 
 
3. The mathematical model: confidence and commodities 
 
In what follows, we develop a mathematical model for a two-country, two-commodity world. 
We show that, gains from trade do not follow where prices are sticky. We begin by 
real-world economics review, issue no. 73 
subscribe for free     WEA eBooks 
 
95 
 
considering a closed economy and the level of consumption therein. This analysis is 
expanded to an open economy model where nations pursue comparative advantage. National 
welfare is compared to the closed economy model. Where prices are sticky, the open 
economy may have lower welfare. 
 
3.1 The closed economy case 
 
Consider a two-good economy, country 1, with goods q and s. The quantities per capita 
produced in one period of time are q1 and s1 respectively. The goods are perishable, thus the 
level of consumption in the absence of trade is also q1 and s1. The maximum per capita level 
of q1 which may be produced is a1 and the maximum level of s1 is b1. The production frontier is 
linear, hence we may write: 
 
 111 1
1 saq b
a−=  
Suppose the numeraire is the per capita production in one time period. The budget constraint 
is 11111 =+ srqp . Hence the prices of good q and good s are p1 = 1
1
a  and r1 = 1
1
b  respectively.  
The budget constraint is equivalent to the production possibility frontier in this case. The 
objective is to maximise utility u = βα 11 sAq  subject to the budget constraint: 
 
 max F(q1, s1, λ) = βα 11 sAq   – λ 





−+ 1
1
1
1
1
b
s
a
q . 
The solutions to this problem are:  
β+α
α
= 11
* aq  and 
β+α
β
= 11
* bs . 
 
3.2 The open economy case – price discrimination 
 
Consider a two-country model in which economy 1 has a comparative advantage in good q; 
i.e. 
2
2
1
1
b
a
b
a > . Therefore economy 1 specialises in good q: a1 units of q are produced, q1 for local 
consumption and (a1 – q1) for export. In each market, the price charged is the greatest the 
market will bear. Because of “sticky prices”, the domestic price in neither economy will adjust 
to the world price. 
 
The price of q in the local economy (as before) is p1 = 
1
1
a  and the price in the foreign economy 
is p2 = 
2
1
a . The price of good s in the local economy is r1 = 1
1
b . The value of exports is 
p2(a1 – q1) and the cost of domestic consumption is p1q1 + r1s1. Hence the budget constraint is:  
p1q1 + r1s1 = p1q1 + p2(a1 – q1)  
2
1
2
1
1
1
a
q
a
a
b
s −= .  
 
 
Therefore we have the constrained maximisation: 
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 max F(q1, s1, λ) = βα 11 sAq   – λ 

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which implies:   
 
β+α
α
= 11
* aq  and 
β+α
β
= 1
2
1
1
* b
a
as . 
 
Comparing this result to the case of the closed economy, we see that economy 1 consumes 
the same amount of good q as before, but it will consume less of good s unless a1 > a2, which 
is to say that it enjoys an absolute advantage in producing good q. In the situation where 
economy 1 enjoys a comparative, but not absolute advantage in good q, the consumption of 
good s declines and the utility of economy 1 must decrease.  
 
Hence, where an economy enjoys a comparative, but not an absolute advantage in 
production, the gains from trade will result only where local prices are allowed to adjust to 
world prices. In the presence of “sticky prices”, international trade may result in a decline in a 
country’s welfare if it does not have an absolute advantage in either good. This confounds the 
standard result from comparative advantage: “small countries have the most to gain from 
international trade” (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010: 437) as small countries, lacking the 
potential for economies of scale, may be at an absolute disadvantage in production of 
tradable goods. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Based on an indicative case study, we suggest that the theory of trade suggested by 
comparative advantage does not lead unambiguously to increases in domestic utility. An 
implicit assumption of the standard model of international trade is that domestic prices of 
tradable goods will adjust to world prices. However, there is a deal of evidence that this 
assumption is not supported by real world practice. Where, through asymmetries of market 
power or for some other reason, world prices do not feed through to the domestic economy, 
our analysis shows the supposed benefits of trade may not be realised. Indeed, the pursuit of 
comparative advantage may leave the domestic economy worse off. In practice, domestic 
governments must address the issues of “sticky prices” and price discrimination as a part of 
their overall approach to international trade. 
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